Competitive Landscape · Fitness Software
In fitness software, the social graph between known peers is the only moat that has survived a decade of carnage.
Synthesis of 11 research batches (110 profiled subjects) plus 11 adversarial critiques. Lads is a social fitness app — private rooms of up to 10 friends competing on workouts, streaks, and challenges; WHOOP + Apple Health sync; a recovery-aware AI coach; protein tracking; and a planned buddy map where solo users post nearby activities others join. Every claim cites research/batches/batch-01 … batch-11, corrected where critiques found errors.
One story with unusual consistency across 108 distinct companies (110 profiled subjects).
The moat that survived: content libraries commoditized (Aaptiv, 8fit, Nike's free apps) [batch-01] [batch-02] [batch-09]. Hardware ate capital: Tonal burned ~$580M and cycled four CEOs, Hydrow raised >$300M for survival rather than dominance, Mirror's $500M acquisition became a $443M impairment — alongside two bankruptcy liquidations, a withdrawn IPO, and four distressed exits [batch-07]. Paying people to work out attracted mercenaries whose engagement died with the yield: every tradable token collapsed >99%, while delight-first apps like Pikmin Bloom compounded to $139M lifetime revenue [batch-06].
Lads' core bet is unusually well-supported. Private rooms of up to 10 actual friends sit in validated whitespace: Stridekick sustains a skeleton crew on free 10-person friend challenges alone [batch-02]; Hevy bootstrapped to ~10M users because its friend feed was the product [batch-04]; Ladder commands 300K+ paid members on team accountability and just validated Lads' roadmap by shipping protein-first nutrition [batch-02]; Peloton's own filings attribute its moat to feeling "with people" [batch-01]. Nobody in eleven categories owns intimate, private, wearable-synced friend rooms.
The two biggest risks are equally clear. First, the map feature walks the deadliest graveyard in the dataset: every standalone stranger-matching attempt (Sweatt, Fitafy, OpenSports' consumer side) died of thin density, not lack of demand [batch-03]. Lads must invert their failure — launch the map from existing rooms, gate it on density, attach commitment mechanics — or inherit their fate. Second, WHOOP is a grudging landlord: it deprecated its v1 API with no grace timeline, caps developer approvals, reserves termination "for any reason," and sued its closest lookalike [batch-05]. HealthKit parity, a canonical local data layer, and deliberate visual distance are survival requirements, not polish.
The GLP-1 era strengthens Lads' hand: protein tracking and muscle preservation became table-stakes messaging (Hims, Zero, Ladder all converged there) [batch-02] [batch-10] [batch-11], while the behavior/social layer is precisely what medication startups cannot own and what remains when users taper [batch-11].
Verdict: build, sharpened. Rooms are the product; the map is a gated expansion of rooms; the AI coach differentiates only because it sees the room; platform armor ships day one.
Eight patterns repeat across every batch that contains survivors. Each is stated with named evidence.
Aaptiv's classes commoditized the moment Peloton launched a digital app — "classes but no teammates." Apple Fitness+ churns despite infinite budget ("users finish a video and feel nothing pull them back"); FitOn's 10M+ users came with no graph — "celebrities get downloads; friends get retention"; Garmin owns measurement and ignores belonging. Meanwhile Strava made solo workouts social first and reached profitability on subscriptions; Hevy's friend feed was the product (10M users on $15K lifetime ad spend); Peloton's moat was emotional — being with people. [batch-01] [batch-02] [batch-04]
Just Play collected money before games — "kills no-shows and self-funds field rental"; games fill two weeks ahead because players re-book favorite hosts. OpenSports built upfront payments into core tooling; Volo sells seasonal leagues as structural retention. Boundary condition: Reddit evidence shows paywalling everything caps the funnel — commitment belongs on high-stakes activities, not all of them. [batch-03]
SmartGym, Gentler Streak, Waterllama, and Streaks converted Apple editorial featuring into years of free distribution — none ran meaningful paid UA. Boostcamp launched on Reddit and crashed its servers overnight; Runna rode Strava API integration as free distribution for years — then got acquired by Strava; Yazio compounded to 100M users on relentless localization with zero VC; Lifesum rode Apple keynote widgets and platform partnerships. [batch-10] [batch-04] [batch-09] [batch-08]
JuggernautAI charges $34.99/month for one persona (intermediate powerlifters) and displaces $200–500/month human coaches; MacroFactor went premium-only for the evidence-based crowd and reached 400K+ users with an owner-influencer instead of ads; Ladder discovered users wanted programming, not 1:1 access, and repriced $60 → $29.99. The cap: FightCamp's authentic boxing niche kept it alive but couldn't grow past it. [batch-04] [batch-08] [batch-02] [batch-07]
Volo retained via seasons, not drop-ins; GoodRec's recurring-host loyalty fills games days ahead; GoodGym's "coach" mechanic — one specific older person waiting for your weekly visit — is the strongest one-to-one commitment loop documented in the buddy-map batch. [batch-03]
StepBet calibrated goals to each user's own 90-day baseline (+31% average steps during challenges) — "essential for mixed-fitness friend groups." [batch-02]
Pikmin Bloom — cute collection, flowers on a shared map, zero financialization — outperformed every paid-to-walk app for four straight years ($8.4M → $38.1M annual). Every token in batch-06 collapsed; the delight apps lived. Waterllama's collectible characters prove delight travels socially at indie cost. [batch-06] [batch-10]
FitnessAI discovered users wanted tutorials and human reassurance, not just algorithm output, and added coach access; JuggernautAI bundles weekly video Q&As with real coaches and an annual plan including time with its founder. Les Mills' 2026 report found only 10% of consumers prefer an AI coach over a human one — Zing hedged by licensing human-led content. [batch-04]
Ten failure patterns, each tied to at least two named cases.
Tonal burned ~$580M and cycled four CEOs; Hydrow's >$300M bought survival, not dominance; Mirror was acquired for $500M cash, took a $443M impairment, and was shut down as a product line; Flywheel liquidated in Chapter 7; CLMBR's $26M+ in celebrity-backed funding ended in a $15.4M fire sale. Only survivors-by-design abandoned factories (Tempo's phone-camera pivot, Litesport's VR pivot). [batch-07]
Mirror's solo streaming "churned after novelty" without a social graph; 8fit's static library decayed for a decade until Withings discontinued it entirely; Aaptiv plateaued into a forced B2B exit; Fiit spent years chasing Peloton-style consumer subs before an honest B2B pivot; WithU's consumer subs stayed modest, forcing holding-company reinvention. [batch-07] [batch-09] [batch-02]
STEPN lost >95% of monthly actives as yield died — users walked for money, quit when it vanished. Lympo's sub-cent rewards "insulted users and quietly rotted retention"; Fitmint cloned the Ponzi mechanics without the war chest; Sweat Economy's millions of walkers were all structurally natural sellers. Control case: Pikmin Bloom — identical behavior, non-monetary reward, compounding revenue. [batch-06]
Pact's pooled payouts shrank to pennies as adherence rose, billing ops failed tens of thousands, and the FTC extracted >$940K before shutdown. DietBet's stake mechanics triggered country-level legal shutdowns and its $20M crowdfund died in formal withdrawal. HealthyWage's house-edge means 60–75% of participants finish having lost money. [batch-09] [batch-02]
Fitafy's reviews say it outright: "I see the same profiles all the time… a year on and still the exact same faces" — 2.3★ and stalled. Sweatt had press timing, a waitlist, and NYC-first concentration, and still became a ghost town without a flywheel or revenue. OpenSports never escaped Toronto (~5,000 users) while its organizer-powered side grew; Datefit financed $9M of ads into a niche pool — leaky-bucket economics flagged in its own arc. [batch-03]
Meetup raised organizer prices to $44.99/month; a Munich/Hamburg organizer publicly deleted groups totalling 4,000+ members, citing costs, weak analytics, and "a high no-show rate," migrating to Instagram + ticketing. Hacker News organizers report being driven away by a $357.98/year bill. People will travel for scheduled events but won't organize them for free forever. [batch-03]
adidas retired the Runtastic brand and turned beloved apps into e-commerce loyalty hooks — "users notice when community becomes commerce." Reward Gateway demoted MoveSpring to "the original iteration of Wellbeing+"; Withings killed 8fit outright; Under Armour wound down Endomondo; lululemon shut Mirror. Even friendly exits hurt: Sweat's founders bought their company back for a fraction after iFIT's chaos. [batch-01] [batch-02] [batch-09] [batch-07]
FitnessAI is the clean experiment: Jake Mor handled engineering, growth, and design alone at $2.1M ARR; when he left, the orphaned app decayed to ad-supported ~$10K/month estimated revenue (batch-09's critic-verified arc supersedes batch-04's erroneous "sold" line — no buyer was ever named). Strong stopped evolving with ~4 people; Athlytic, SmartGym, Pedometer++, HabitKit, and Waterllama are alive-but-capped by key-person bandwidth. Counter-failure: Zero shows VC overhead on a fad category is equally fatal. [batch-09] [batch-04] [batch-05] [batch-10]
Fastic grabbed the fasting wave, then never built a second habit loop when interest cooled — ~$10K/month modeled on tens of millions of installs. GLP-1s gutted Zero's entire premise, forcing a protein-and-companion reframe; DoFasting's quiz funnel bought growth with brand poison and was starved once supplements out-earned it; Sweatt's founder simply moved on. [batch-08] [batch-10] [batch-03]
Elite HRV's Google Fit/Health Connect integration has been broken with "no firm timeline" per its own docs — beloved tool, frozen roadmap. Garmin rejected Hevy's API application; Strava integration took years. WHOOP deprecated v1 outright with no grace timeline, stranding integrators. Junction exists because multi-source sync breaks constantly — and inherits every upstream breakage as its own emergency. [batch-05] [batch-04]
The section that matters most. The map feature enters the single deadliest category in the research — every standalone stranger-matching attempt is dead, stalled, or zombified — but the batches document exactly what kills these products and what the survivors did instead.
Every failure above happened to products where strangers matched strangers from zero. Lads' map launches onto existing rooms — a room posting its Saturday run is an organized group with attendance culture, the inverse of Fitafy's empty pool. Cross-batch takeaway: "friends-mode demand is real and underserved… Lads' buddy framing is the correct wedge." [batch-03]
The playbook stays a slogan until the gates carry numbers. Where the batches supply them, they are used verbatim below; anything else is labeled judgment call.
| Gate | Number | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Ghost-town floor | Fewer than ~50 distinct nearby profiles/pins is where Fitafy died ("only 50 profiles… still the exact same faces"; "opens the map twice and sees the same three pins, they churn permanently") | [batch-03] |
| Deposit size | ~$10 per 90-minute game was GoodRec's historical anchor; the batch's own lesson recommends "even $5" of skin-in-the-game on map-posted activities | [batch-03] |
| Liquidity health signal | Prepaid games filling two weeks ahead | [batch-03] |
| Poster-fee red line | Meetup's $44.99/mo organizer plans (Feb 2025) and organizers' cited $357.98/yr bills triggered the documented revolt — including deletion of groups totalling 4,000+ members | [batch-03] |
| Staleness TTL | Sweatt's 21-day expiry pruned zombie profiles | [batch-03] |
| Area-launch resourcing | GoodGym opened areas only against ~£25,000 local commissioning funding; Playo entered cities only after venue supply; GoodRec only after facility partnerships plus local hosts | [batch-03] |
Lads' richest data arrives through APIs it does not control. Three exposures, all documented.
WHOOP sued Finerpoint d/b/a Bevel on March 17, 2026 in Delaware for trade dress, copyright, and patent infringement over its recovery/strain/sleep presentation — the exact surfaces a "WHOOP-on-your-Watch" clone presents. (Docket no. 1:2026cv00289 is cited with explicit provenance: it appears in the batch-05 critique's Justia-docket verification, not in batch-05 itself.) No injunction as of April 2026; trial expected to take over a year. The strategic lesson: "distinct design isn't just taste, it's legal armor" — Lads must be deliberately unlike WHOOP in look, language, and feature surface so the integration reads as complementary plumbing, not a clone.
Medication reshapes the market around behavior — which is the layer Lads owns.
Never chain membership value to a drug or supplier you don't control (Calibrate's consumer collapse) · a medication companion is a feature, never the identity · frame aspirationally, not clinically (Superpower's consumer-brand playbook) · import lab results and coach around them socially rather than building anything medical. [batch-11]
Eleven categories, one question each: does anyone already live where Lads wants to build?
| Category | Closest collision | Verdict | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Category kings [batch-01] | Strava (social athletes); MyFitnessPal (protein logging) | Escape with two flank checks | Strava is public broadcast athlete-identity at 180M scale; Lads is ≤10 known-peer privacy — a different unit. But Strava buys engagement apps (Runna, Breakaway), so stay differentiated. On nutrition: don't out-log MFP; make macros a room stat. Garmin/Nike/adidas/Apple ignore belonging entirely. |
| 2. Friend competition [batch-02] | Ladder | Escape, watch closely | Ladder is the strongest operator ($123.5M, 300K+ paid) and just entered protein — convergence signal. But its "teams" are thousands-strong and coach-mediated; Lads' intimacy is friend-mediated, the layer Ladder never built. DietBet/StepBet's money stakes carry regulatory weight Lads deliberately avoids. |
| 3. Buddy-map [batch-03] | None living; Sweatt/Fitafy corpses | Whitespace — conditional | No survivor offers free-form, wearable-synced buddy matching. The graveyard died of cold-start/flake mechanics, not absent demand (58% made friends via fitness groups). Collision only occurs if Lads repeats their launch mistakes. |
| 4. AI coaches [batch-04] | Fitbod, Zing, JuggernautAI | Surface collision, escapable | Adaptive programming is table stakes (Fitbod did it years ago). The escape is input-side: a coach that references the room ("you're last on the streak; recover tonight") — personalization plus peer pressure none can copy without a graph. FitnessAI warns an AI coach alone decays. |
| 5. Wearable analytics [batch-05] | WHOOP (as supplier and litigant) | Must NOT collide | WHOOP sued Bevel for looking like it. Consume scores; never re-derive them. Complementarity is legal posture as much as strategy. |
| 6. Move-to-earn [batch-06] | None | Zero collision | Negative lesson space only: no tradable incentives, ever. Social standing is the only currency that appreciated. |
| 7. Hardware dead pool [batch-07] | None (software-only) | Validated escape | Software-only is the batch's conclusion — Tempo and Litesport survived by becoming what Lads already is. Caveat: Peloton litigated leaderboards twice (beat Flywheel, settled Echelon) — original friend-graph mechanics, cleanly owned. |
| 8. Nutrition [batch-08] | Lose It!, Yazio, MacroFactor | Escape via reframing | Protein tracking as logging is contested turf with database moats (56M foods at Lose It!). As a team stat, it's uncontested. MacroFactor's transparency and Carbon's outsourced-DB weakness both validate Lads' curated-DB, published-reasoning pattern. |
| 9. Accelerator alumni [batch-09] | Runna (cautionary) | Escape with one warning | Runna built atop Strava's graph and was absorbed by it. Any deep dependence on a bigger graph can convert a channel into an acquirer — relevant to both WHOOP and Strava relationships. Fittr shows community funnels mint coaches; Pact shows money-stakes invite the FTC. |
| 10. Indie hackers [batch-10] | Utility trackers (Strong, Gymverse) | Escape | These win on UX and ASO but are "structurally incapable of friendship-based retention" (the Gymverse verdict). Steal their distribution (Apple featuring, building in public); ignore their category. |
| 11. GLP-1 metabolic [batch-11] | None (no drugs, no labs) | Adjacency, not collision | Lads is the behavior layer the winners lack and the survivors kept (Hims' Movement pillar, Nutrisense's dietitians). Import results; sell behavioral certainty. |
Net: Lads collides head-on nowhere. Its two flank risks are Strava's acquisitiveness and WHOOP's litigation habit — both manageable by staying small-private-complementary rather than public-broadcast-competitive.
The strongest case against, answered from the evidence — then the ceiling test nobody gets to skip.
Every private-room analog stayed small; every large outcome used a different engine.
The category's biggest intimate-flavored success is also the clearest evidence for the ceiling: Ladder's "teams" are thousands-strong and coach-mediated, not ≤10 and friend-mediated, and reaching 300K+ paid required repricing from $60, TikTok creative, and a $90M go-to-market check. Even Ladder effectively abandoned small-room intimacy on its way to scale. [batch-02]
What rooms demonstrably deliver is retention, not acquisition: Fitbod's corpus shows users logging 3+ workouts in week one are 76% active at day 60 — churn is decided in week one, exactly where a room applies pressure; DietBet players who posted and cheered lost more weight; Ladder credits shared programming plus team chat. No batch shows rooms acquiring at venture rates. [batch-04] [batch-02]
Evidence: the three citations directly above.
Borrowed mechanically without changing what a room is: Meetup's fitness vertical ~3.28M members, 59% run-club growth, Gen Z 4x preference; GoodRec's shareable per-game links produced word-of-mouth loops; Reddit alone crashed Boostcamp's servers at launch; Apple editorial featuring substituted for entire ad budgets at four indies; HabitKit converted building-in-public into pre-launch customers; Hevy's K>1 sharing scaled distribution nearly free; Runna rode platform-integration distribution for years; Fittr's free communal rituals were "fitness's cheapest acquisition machine." The map is precisely this kind of public surface — which is why §4 carries numeric gates and kill criteria rather than slogans. [batch-03] [batch-04] [batch-10] [batch-09]
Nothing in this dataset shows an invite-only known-peer room product reaching venture scale, and no batch documents a rooms-seeded map succeeding — that inversion is Lads' hypothesis, not a finding. Two ambitions must not be conflated: bootstrap-durable (supported by present evidence): a MacroFactor/Yazio/Simple-class profitable subscription business — premium pricing power proven at $29.99–$99/yr bands, retention supplied by rooms; this outcome does not require the map to work. Venture-scale (conditional): requires the public/map layer to pass the §4 gates — density floors held, repeat-participation conversion rising, areas surviving trial windows. If those gates fail repeatedly, the evidence-backed ceiling is the durable-small tier, and the founder should know that is the bet being made. [batch-04] [batch-05] [batch-08]
Do not pivot: every component is individually validated, and the only unproven thing is the combination — precisely where the whitespace sits. Sharpen in this order: rooms are the product, the map is gated expansion of rooms, the coach is the room's narrator, platform armor is day-one infrastructure. Endorsed ambition, per the ceiling test: bootstrap-durable by default; venture-scale only if the map passes its §4 gates — and the gates, not optimism, make that call.
All 110 profiled subjects. Filter by text, category, or status.
| # | Startup | Category | Status 2025–26 | One-line outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Strava | Social tracking | Alive, strong | $2.2B valuation May 2025, ~$500M ARR track, 180M users, IPO prep |
| 2 | Peloton | Connected fitness | Alive, public | First-ever profitable year FY2026 ($63.2M net income) as subs fell to 2.55M |
| 3 | Zwift | Virtual racing | Alive, private | Post-correction: repeated layoffs, 33% price hike, refocused on "efficient growth" |
| 4 | MyFitnessPal | Nutrition tracking | Alive, growing again | 220M users; exploring >$1B sale (Apr 2026); absorbed Cal AI |
| 5 | Fitbit (Google) | Wearables | Effectively sunset | Accounts die May 19, 2026; starved under Google, founders exited |
| 6 | Garmin Connect | Device ecosystem | Thriving | Record FY2025 ($7.25B rev); Connect+ adds AI nutrition; social still thin |
| 7 | Nike Run Club / Training Club | Brand apps | Alive and free | Marketing funnels; added live location sharing Nov 2024; never monetized |
| 8 | adidas Runtastic | Running apps | Absorbed | Independent brand retired 2019; folded into adidas commerce loyalty |
| 9 | Apple Fitness+ | Subscription content | Alive but troubled | "One of Apple's weakest digital offerings"; high churn; bundled viability |
| 10 | Freeletics | AI coaching | Alive, private | FitLab subsidiary; growth stalled (48M→57M users over eight years) |
| 11 | DietBet | Weight-loss betting | Alive | Acquired by Appex Group 2025; $20M crowdfund withdrawn; geo-legal caps |
| 12 | HealthyWage | Weight-loss wagering | Alive, private | Bootstrapped-ish, B2B-funded; house-edge means most users leave as losers |
| 13 | StepBet | Step betting | Alive | Under Appex since 2023; baseline-relative goals proven academically |
| 14 | Ladder | Team strength training | Alive, strongest operator | $123.5M raised; 300K+ paid members; shipped protein nutrition Oct 2025 |
| 15 | FitOn | Free workout content | Alive, Series D | Feb 2025 round; Highmark dropped its Medicare contract Aug 2025 |
| 16 | SWEAT (Itsines) | Women's subscription | Alive, founder-owned | Bought back from iFIT late 2023 after $85M loss; trainers departing |
| 17 | Playbook | Creator fitness | Alive, self-sustaining? | Self-reported $233M creator payouts; no institutional round since 2022 |
| 18 | Aaptiv | Audio classes | Alive, B2B-only | Consumer app decayed (3.0★) under PEAR; pivoted to employer/Medicare |
| 19 | MoveSpring | Corporate step challenges | Alive, being absorbed | Inside Reward Gateway; demoted to "original iteration of Wellbeing+" |
| 20 | Stridekick | Consumer step challenges | Alive, re-energized | New president Mar 2025; free-for-decade then 2025 paywall backlash |
| 21 | Playo | Sports community + booking | Alive, growing | ~5M users, 150 cities; profitable since Nov 2022 on booking commissions |
| 22 | OpenSports | Pickup organizing | Alive, small | Consumer side stalled ~5K users in Toronto; pivoted to organizer SaaS |
| 23 | Just Play | Pickup games | Alive (as GoodRec) | Rebranded ~2023; prepaid-host model bootstrapped year one |
| 24 | GoodRec | Pickup games | Alive | 1M+ players claimed, 4.9 iOS; price creep churn visible in reviews |
| 25 | Volo Sports | Social leagues | Alive, consolidating | PE roll-up; acquired ZogSports Jun 2025; ~13 dense metros |
| 26 | GoodGym | Fitness + volunteering | Alive (charity) | Grant-capped, UK-only; strongest commitment mechanic documented |
| 27 | Meetup | Events platform | Alive under Bending Spoons | 60M+ members; organizer fee revolt and group deletions documented |
| 28 | Fitafy | Fitness dating | Alive, struggling | Density trap ("same 50 faces"); Google Play 2.3★; stalled outside metros |
| 29 | Datefit | Fitness dating/friends | Alive, sub-scale | Financed $9M ad spend into niche pool; 3.0 iOS rating |
| 30 | Sweatt | Fitness dating | Zombie/dormant | Operational without traction; founder moved to ateam; no disclosed institutional funding found unverified |
| 31 | Fitbod | ML strength plans | Alive, independent | Recovery-aware pioneer; 15M+ downloads; deliberately under-raised |
| 32 | FitnessAI | AI lifting coach | Faded | Solo stall; YC lists "Acquired," buyer never named; app decayed to ads [batch-04][batch-09] |
| 33 | Zing Coach | AI coach + CV | Alive, scaling | PSG (Jan 2026) and Les Mills (Mar 2026) partnerships; $12.4M raised |
| 34 | JuggernautAI | Powerlifting AI | Alive, bootstrapped | Niche domination at $34.99/mo replacing $200–500 human coaches |
| 35 | Boostcamp | Free program library | Alive, independent | 1M+ lifters via Reddit distribution; monetization lags badly |
| 36 | Hevy | Social gym tracker | Alive, profitable | Bootstrapped to 10M+ users on viral K>1; ~$800K/mo est.; no AI coach yet |
| 37 | Strong | Workout logger | Alive, lifestyle business | Great UX plateaued ~#20K rank; no social, no AI, tiny team |
| 38 | Caliber | Human coaching ladder | Alive, independent | Free tracker → $19 Pro → $200+/mo humans; profitable-leaning |
| 39 | Future | 1:1 elite coaching | Alive, merged | Autograph rescue merger Jan–Mar 2025; NPS 90 but brutal margins |
| 40 | Alpha Progression | Hypertrophy tracker | Alive, maintained | Two-person German shop; honest freemium earns 4.85★ loyalty |
| 41 | WHOOP | Recovery wearable | Alive decacorn | $10.1B valuation Mar 2026; $1.1B bookings run-rate; pre-IPO; API gatekeeper |
| 42 | Oura | Smart ring | Alive, dominant | Confidential S-1 May 2026; ~$11B valuation; patent aggression vs rivals |
| 43 | Ultrahuman | Ring + CGM | Alive, embattled | Lost ITC case → US import bar Oct 2025; valuation stepped down to ~$400M talks |
| 44 | Eight Sleep | Smart mattress | Alive, $1.5B val | FCF-positive 2025; AWS outage "bricked" beds Oct 2025 |
| 45 | Athlytic | Watch recovery scores | Alive, indie | Solo dev, 4.8★, actively shipping; zero social graph |
| 46 | Bevel | AI health coach | Alive, litigating | $14M raised, 100K+ DAU; sued by WHOOP Mar 17, 2026 |
| 47 | HRV4Training | Camera HRV science | Alive, bootstrapped | Research-grade credibility; niche scale; researcher UX |
| 48 | Elite HRV | Chest-strap HRV | Alive but stagnant | Spren SDK pivot; broken Health Connect fix "no firm timeline" |
| 49 | Welltory | Stress aggregator | Alive, credit-financed | Braavo facility Nov 2025; breadth over depth; solo dashboard plateau |
| 50 | Vital → Junction | Wearable/lab API | Alive, VC-backed | $18M Creandum Mar 2025; inherits every upstream breakage |
| 51 | STEPN | Move-to-earn NFT | Economically dead | GMT −99.82% from ATH; MAU fell >95%; app functions, economics don't |
| 52 | Sweatcoin | Steps-to-rewards | Company alive | Top-grossing app pivoting to partnerships/ads; 190M registered claim |
| 53 | SWEAT token | M2E crypto | Economically broken | ~0.01× recorded ICO price; Apr 2026 exploit drained then restored funds |
| 54 | Genopets | M2E pet RPG | Effectively dormant | GENE >99.9% down; game in perpetual beta limbo |
| 55 | Aglet | Sneaker walking game | Alive, niche | Only M2E entrant that never blew up community with a token |
| 56 | Lympo | Early M2E | Dead as M2E | Dormant Animoca NFT brand; LYM delisted Dec 2024 |
| 57 | Fitmint | STEPN clone | Functionally abandoned | Quiet death; FITT at 0.01× ICO; silence since 2023 |
| 58 | Pikmin Bloom | Delight walking game | Best-ever trajectory | $139M lifetime revenue, record 2026; intrinsic rewards beat all M2E |
| 59 | Walkr | Gamified steps | Alive, micro-scale | Decade of updates; stalled growth; solo play limits ceiling |
| 60 | Dotmoovs | AI skill battles | Effectively zombie | MOOV ~0.07× ICO; 3,079 holders; top-10 wallets hold 71% |
| 61 | WIRTUAL | Exercise-to-earn | App alive, token inert | Challenge-entry model soundest in batch; no global distribution |
| 62 | Mirror | Home fitness screen | Shut down | lululemon killed hardware 2023 after $443M impairment |
| 63 | Tonal | Digital strength | Alive, stabilizing | Survived via ~$580M and four CEOs; Tonal 2 Jan 2025 |
| 64 | Tempo | 3D-camera strength | Alive, zombie-leaning | Shrank to phone-camera AI training; quiet since 2021 raise |
| 65 | Flywheel Sports | Connected cycling | Dead | Chapter 7 Sept 2020 after admitting Peloton patent infringement |
| 66 | Hydrow | Connected rowing | Alive, private | >$300M bought survival not dominance; founder exited 2024 |
| 67 | iFIT Health & Fitness | Mass connected fitness | Alive, private | Withdrew $600M IPO; valuation −60%; refocused on subscriptions |
| 68 | FightCamp | Connected boxing | Alive, sub-scale | $90M Series B hit niche TAM ceiling; international took four years |
| 69 | Liteboxer → Litesport | Rhythm boxing → VR | Zombie relative to funding | Quest pivot doubled subscriber base in 27 days; hardware stranded |
| 70 | CLMBR | Connected climber | Acquired (fire sale) | $15.4M EV vs $26M+ raised; celebrity capital didn't retain |
| 71 | Lose It! | Calorie tracking | Alive under Ziff Davis | 15-year organic growth; paid-UA failed at 10% ROAS |
| 72 | Noom | Behavior change | Alive, clinical-led | GLP-1 pivot rebuilt revenue, torched community; IPO floated Feb 2026 |
| 73 | WeightWatchers | Weight management | Alive post-bankruptcy | Chapter 11 wiped $1.15B debt; clinical ARPU >4x behavioral |
| 74 | Lifesum | Nutrition app | Alive, independent | 65M users via platform partnerships; AI features arrived late (Feb 2025) |
| 75 | Yazio | Nutrition app | Alive, bootstrapped | Europe #1, 100M+ users, zero VC; localization compounder |
| 76 | MacroFactor | Macro coaching | Alive, zero VC | 400K+ users; radical algorithm transparency; creator-equity distribution |
| 77 | Carbon Diet Coach | Macro coaching | Alive, premium niche | Expert-coded logic; outsourced FatSecret DB undermines daily use |
| 78 | Fastic | Fasting app | Alive but sub-scale | Trend cooled; ~$10K/mo modeled on 32.8M installs |
| 79 | Fooducate | Food grading | Maintained but static | Barcode-grading IP decayed; Maple Media holding-co stewardship |
| 80 | Simple | AI weight-loss coach | Alive, scaling | $160M ARR; refused GLP-1 prescribing; gamified pet + AI chat |
| 81 | Pact / GymPact | Commitment fines | Dead | Shut July 2017; FTC settlement >$940K; payouts shrank to pennies |
| 82 | Skimble | Workout trainer app | Alive, independent | 16 years bootstrapped; profitable niche; declined growth capital |
| 83 | FitBark | Pet wearables | Alive, private | Vet-research channel moat; ~$245K equity; ecosystem-fit accelerator |
| 84 | Runna | Running plans | Acquired by Strava | Community cap table → profitable → Strava acquisition Apr–May 2025 |
| 85 | 8fit | Home workouts + meals | Dead | Withings discontinued service June 26, 2026; library decayed |
| 86 | Fiit / ONE FIIT | Connected fitness app | Alive, B2B-pivoted | Profitable at 41% EBITDA run-rate delivering Hyrox classes in 107 countries |
| 87 | WithU / 10XU | Audio coaching | Alive, rebranded | JV-driven distribution (Sky, Collinson); £11.5M total |
| 88 | Fittr | Community coaching | Active | WhatsApp-groups origin minted 500+ coaches; slipped to losses FY22 |
| 89 | Cult.fit | Omnichannel fitness | Alive, IPO-track | DRHP filed Jul 2026; franchise-heavy; losses cut 48% |
| 90 | Cal AI | Photo-AI calorie app | Acquired by MyFitnessPal | Teens' side project to $30M revenue in ~18 months; closed Dec 2025 |
| 91 | Gentler Streak | "Kind" tracker | Alive, indie | Apple Watch App of the Year 2022; awards ≠ revenue (<$120K/yr est.) |
| 92 | Waterllama | Hydration tracker | Alive | Delight moat; collectible characters; franchise expanding |
| 93 | SmartGym | Watch gym planner | Alive, solo | Watch App of the Year 2023; Apple featuring flywheel; bus factor |
| 94 | Zero | Fasting tracker | Alive, actively shipping | GLP-1s gutted fasting premise; pivoted to protein/GLP-1 companion |
| 95 | Streaks | Habit tracker | Alive, healthy | #1 top-paid H&F US App Store; scope discipline held niche 10+ years |
| 96 | Gymverse | AI gym planner | Alive, portfolio app | Faceless Fitness22 factory; ratings-wall defense; no emotional lock-in |
| 97 | DoFasting | Quiz-funnel fasting | Wind-down/neglect | Parent Kilo thrived (€500M); shame-marketing poisoned the app |
| 98 | Pedometer++ | Step counter | Alive, thriving | 13 years solo; first-mover on sensors earned permanent press |
| 99 | HabitKit | Habit grid tracker | Alive, growing | Building-in-public → $602K 2025; Q1 seasonality; red ocean |
| 100 | Hims & Hers | Telehealth giant | Alive, public | FY25 $2.35B revenue; "Movement" pillar survived three strategy resets |
| 101 | Ro | Telehealth | Alive, $7B flat | Insurance/supply certainty tooling; pharma channel deals won |
| 102 | Found | Weight care | Operating, quiet | Generic-drug path, low ARPU; faded from conversation |
| 103 | Calibrate | Metabolic reset | Consumer dead, enterprise alive | Refund mountain + lender control; enterprise ≈90% post-Feb 2026 |
| 104 | Noom Med | Clinical GLP-1 vertical | Flagship, churning | $100M run-rate in 4 months; coaches cut twice; cannibalized parent |
| 105 | Function Health | Lab panels | Alive, $2.5B val | $298M Series B; Ezra MRI acquisition; owns zero behavior change |
| 106 | Superpower | Preventive super-app | Operating | Celebrity cap table, aspirational framing; follower pricing problem |
| 107 | Levels | CGM metabolic | Alive, plateaued | Community rounds instead of priced Series B; founder-politics drag |
| 108 | Nutrisense | CGM + dietitians | Acquired by Dexcom | Jun 2026 exit; acquirer wanted the human coaching layer, not hardware |
| 109 | January AI | Glucose prediction | Active, B2B pivot | Invisible infrastructure for GLP-1 care; abandoned consumer brand |
| 110 | FitnessAI (see row 32) | AI lifting coach | Faded | Covered jointly from batch-04 and critic-corrected batch-09 |
Counting note: the 11 batches document 110 assigned subjects across 111 profile entries. Two reconciliations: (1) Just Play and GoodRec are the same company (rebrand ~2023; Android package unchanged) — listed as two rows per the batch's own treatment [batch-03]; (2) FitnessAI is covered by both batch-04 and batch-09 — one row cites both. Sweatcoin and its SWEAT token are split into two rows per batch-06's explicit treatment (company vs. token economics). Statuses are condensed from each batch's "Status 2025–26" line.